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of mankind. This study was done in an attempt.to measure, behaviorally 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Purpose of the.Study 
The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of coopera-
tion and competition upon personal space, Personal space has been des-
cribed as a series of changing, concentric, spatial globes surrounding 
an individual and moving about with him (Little, 1965; Sommer, 1959). 
Hall (1959) conceives of personal space as a well developed complex of 
patte~ed spatial modes of relating to, and communicating with, others 
in the environment, Specific patterns have been experimentaUy identi-
fied by Kuethe (1962a, 1962b), Kuethe and Weingartner (1964) and Sommer 
(1967a). 
Cooperation and competition have .been studied quite extensively 
using a wide variety of tasks (Bass and Dunteman, 1963; Blake and 
Mouton, 1962; Crombag, 1966; Grossack, 1954; Julian, Bishop, and · 
Fiedler, 1966; Julian and Perry, 1967). A general finding of this lit-
erature is .that ingroup cooperation and outgroup competition produce 
ingroup cohesiveness, as measured by different adjective check lists 
and semantic differential scales. Although it has never been shown, it 
seems that cooperation and competition may be important factors influ-
encing personal space. 
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Personal Space and Behavior 
Personal space is a relatively new area of study for psychologists. 
Concepts similar to personal space have been used by ethologists and 
other natural scientists to explain many forms of animal behavior 
(Ardrey 1 1966 1 1970; Morris 1 1969; Wienecke, 1970). Such concepts im-
ply that spatial patterns are the end result, or behavioral balance 1 of 
the interaction of a number of animal instincts. Pe~sonal space in 
human beings is hypothesized to be the end result of .a balance between 
cohesive and dispersive processes that help maintain the integrity of 
the individual. Cooperation and competition appear to be two factors 
that contribute to cohesion-dispersion and the overall balance present 
in personal space. In order to understand the significance of personal 
space in the behavior of man 1 it will be helpful to examine the uses of 
similar terms. 
Wienecke (1970) states that the dominant organizing characteristic 
of all animal life is the perpetuation of life itself. Secondary and 
tertiary characteristics have developed in the course of evolution. 
Secondary and tertiary characteristics of life would include the pro~ 
pensity to: (1) mate; (2) survive as an individual; (3) incorporate 
raw materials for growth and survival; (4) protect from toxic influ-
ences; (5) express intraspecific aggression; (6) establish and defend 
territories; (7) form groups and establish group organization and in-
group amity; (8) cqntrol the environment through the use of implements; 
(9) control environment through the use of individually and gr9up ac~ 
quired memory~ and (10) use symbols as a way of processing, storing 1 
retrieving and transmitting memory within or between organisms. All of 
these characteristics can be placed within the cohesion-dispersion 
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schema. 
Animals fight illllOngst themselves either to establish their domi-
nance in a socia+ hierarchy or to establish their territorial rights 
over a particµlar piece of ground. Some species are purely hierarchi-
cal with no fixed territories, while others are purely territorial with 
no hierarchy,struggles. Some have hierarchies within their territories 
and have to contend ~ith both forms of aggression. Man belongs to this 
last group. 
In the course of evolution, Morris (1969) hypothesizes that as man 
progressed from a fe9d gathering to a food growing animal, he had to .. 
increase communication and sha,ring of food (cooperation or cohesiveness) 
and decrease his aggressive (competitive or dispersive) tendencies. 
Thus man began to form groups; which in turn defended their group ter-
ritory. Ingroup cohesiveness became balanced by outgroup dispersion, 
and the result was a balance in terms of "group space". 
Within these groups, however, pair-bonded units or families began 
to form. Since the family needed to be protected from outsiders, an-
other outlet for aggressiveness was provided. The spatial defense of 
the family or home .has remained despite many architectural advances. 
Houses are carefully fenced, hedged or walled off from intrusive neigh.., 
bors, and these lines of demarcation are adhered to rigidly (Hediger, 
1959; Morris, 1969; Sommer, 1967b). The family protects its integrity 
in terms of space. The resulting balance is again one between ingroup 
cohesion (family cooperation) and outgroup dispersion (protection of. 
the family). 
The balance between cohesive and dispersive tendencies manifests 
itself on a more individual level, and this balance has been called 
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personal space. Personal space in humans seems to be closely related 
to territoriality in animals. Just as many animals will become uneasy 
and attack whatever invades their territory, humans will become uncom-
fortable and attempt to make adjustments if another person violates 
their personal space (Hall, 1959; Felipe and Sommer, 1966). Sommer 
(1969) describes the everyday tactics of placing personal belongings in 
certain locations to identify one's territory. For example, placing 
one's books on the libarary table, or leaving one's coat in a chair 
will usually serve as a socially acceptable line of demarcation. 
Ardrey (1970) graphically describes many of America's urban prob-
lems in the context of territorial aggression. As urban concentration 
grows, competition appears to be shifting from dominance over a piece 
of space to dominance over our fellow man in the form of social hier-
archies. As hierarchies develop, top prizes for competition become 
fewer. Consequently man mo.st seek new space, adjustments, alliances, 
dispensations, tolerances, mutual goals, mutual defenses, laws, punish-
ments and opportunities for achievement. Thus has developed a body of 
rules of infinite complexity which actually encourages competition, as 
long as it is not violent. The problem of man is not that he is ag-
gressive, but that he breaks rules and becomes violent. As wars become 
more capable of total des.truction, social violence increases. Regarding 
the necessity for some expression of personal space in man, Ardrey 
(1970) says: 
Given space, territorial arrangements make possible the in~· 
vulnerable individual. Stripped of space that is his own, 
deterritorialized man is stripped.of his invulnerability. 
And we shall see, I believe, that man - the stroller is 
space, the presumable master of all he surveys - is in t'!'l'ith 
as vulnerable a creature as nature has·. ever created. • . . And 
that, down below all the asphalt and concrete, is the final 
statement of the urban problem. 
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Ardrey (1970) and Wienecke (1970) consider the prognosis for sur-
vival of contemporary American society to be gu~rded. The reason for 
such pessimism is that two different types of human characteristics are 
in a fierce struggle with one another. On the one.hand, we have the 
propensity for intraspec:ific aggression, acquisition of territory and 
status and the making of weapons to wage wars - all forms of competi-
tive activity. On the other hand, we have those propensities concerned 
with perpetuating life - all form~ of cooperative activity. Man cannot 
survive without either and so a balance is sought, and one.manifestation 
of this balance is personal space, These observations point out the 
need for research in the area of cooperation, competition and personal 
space. 
Review of the Literature on Personal Space 
Types of Personal Space Measures 
The concept of personal space has just recently been subjected to 
scientific study. Throughout these studies, situations varying from 
real life to paper and pencil measures have been used to determine per-
sonal space responses. 
Rawls, Trego and McGaffey (1968a) compared several different tech-
niques that have been used to measure personal space. They used the 
real life situation, called the .field test, as the criterion. In the 
field test, the subject was asked to walk toward another individual. 
The personal space measure was.the distance the subject stopped from 
the person he was approa~hing, The field test was compared to a .simu-
lated personal distance test, a multiple choice test, a circle drawing 
test and a square drawing test. In the .simulated, personal distance 
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test 1 male figures cut from magnetized plastic were mani'pu1ated on a, 
board. The subject was asked to imagine he was one of the figures as 
the other moved toward him, as well as imagine he was the moving figure. 
In.the multiple choice test, two male figure drawings were pre-
sented on a,sheet of paper at varying distances from one another (1/4 
inch to 3 1/2 inches), One figure was labeled "X" and the other "Y". 
The letters a, b, ~ and d represented increasing distances between the. 
two figures. The subject was. asked to imagine that he was person "X" 1 
and he was asked to position "Y" as he would in. ordinary situations. 
The circle drawing test showed male figure drawings from the front, 
side, rear and above views. These drawings were presented alone on a 
sheet of paper. The subject was asked to imagine that he was this per-
son being seen from the particular view, and was asked to ·draw a circle 
around the figure,that indicated how far he liked people to stay in 
ordinary situations. 
The square drawing test was the same as the circle drawing test 1 
except a square was drawn around each figure. Each of these procedures 
correlated with the field test as follows: simulated personal space 
(r = • 70}, multiple choice test (r = • 43), square drawing test (r = . 35) 
and circle drawing test (r = .34). 
A number of studies have used silhou~tte or stick figures to obtain 
personal space measures (Addis, 1966; Dosey. and Meisels 1 1969; Fisher, 
1967; Little, 1965, 1968; Little, Ulehla and Henderson, 1968; Trego, 
1969; Weinstine, 1965, 1967). In most of these studies, the subjects 
were asked to imagine that silhouette figures of varying size were real 
people in different types of situations. Usually the subject imagined 
he was one of these figures, and the personal space measure was the 
distance between figures. This measure is very similar to both the 
simulated personal distance test and the multiple choice test used by 
Rawls, Trego and McGaffey (1968a). 
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Seating distance is another type .of personal space measure that 
has been used (Dosey and Meisels, 1969; Leipold, 1963; Mehrabian, 1968b; 
Sommer, 1962, 1965) • The subject is asked to take a seat at a tab le, 
and the distance he places himself from certain other individuals is 
the measure of personal space, Dosey and Meisels (1969) compared the 
silhouette, seating and field test measures of personal space and found 
no consistent relation among measures, The apparent contradiction in 
the .results of Dosey and Meisels (1969) and Rawls, Trego and McGaffey 
(1968a) can probably be explained by the differences in experimental 
procedure. Dosey and Meisels (1969) asked their subjects to approach 
or imagine approaching another person under stressful conditions. 
Experimental ~ork using these measures has isolated at least three 
important variables that influence personal space: (1) the present 
psychological state of the individual; (2) the environmental and task 
setting; and (3) the characteristics of the invading person or object. 
The Present Psychological State 
Williams (1963) showed that introverts placed themselves further 
from people than extroverts. This conclusion was also supported by 
Leipold (1963), who included praise and anxiety conditions. Closer 
seating was noticed for both groups in the praising condition, and ex-
troverts tended to sit closer in both conditions. 
Another psychological variable is that of perceived shared beliefs 
with others. The evidence regarding this variable is unclear. Little, 
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Ulehla and Henderson (1968), using 6-inch silhouette figures placed 
against a black background, found that Goldwater supporters were placed 
closer together than were Goldwater-Johnson pairs. Johnson-Johnson 
pairs, however, showed no significant placement trends. Elkin (1964) 
used actual discussion groups composed of pro-pro, pro-anti and anti-
anti Medicare students and found no differences in pairwise seating 
distances. The difference in these findings is possibly due to the 
nature of the perceived beliefs. That is, perhaps feelings regarding 
presidential candidates were much stronger than those regarding 
Medicare; 
Gottheil 1 Corey and Paredes (1968) found that the subjective feel-. 
ing of "closeness" correlates with closeness in real interaction si tua-
tions. They had subjects place magnetized representations of themselves 
next to a representation of the·experimenter. Subjects placing them-
selves closer in this condition also placed themselves closer during a 
real interview. 
Hare and Bales (1963) noted that subjects high in dominance needs 
tended to place themselves in centrally located chairs during a discus-
sion. Beam (1971) found that subjects high in dominance needs ap-
proached an experimental cohort faster and had less personal space in 
relation to the cohort than did subjects with lower dominance needs, 
Weinstine (1967) showed that subjects with high affiliation needs esti-
mated from memory less distance between silhouette figures than sub-
jects lower in affiliative needs. 
Fromme and Schmidt (1970) had college subjects enact four differ-
ent affective states: neutral, fear, anger and sorrow. They approached 
an assistant. under thes.e four different conditions. Results showed the 
greatest personal space under the fear condition and greater distance 
under sorrow than anger conditions. 
Dosey and Meisels (1969) measured personal space in college sub-
jects under stress and neutral conditions. In the stress condition, 
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one group of subjects approacl).ed a person who was evaluating their sex 
appeal. In the neutral condition, a second group of subjects approached 
a person while "the orienting reflex" was being studied. The stress 
condition resulted in greater personal space. 
Horowitz, Duff and Stratton (1964) found that schizophrenic sub-
jects approached an inanimate object, such as a hatrack, more closely 
than they approached other people. They obtained similar results with 
non-schizophrenic psychiatric patients. Weinstine (1965), using groups 
of emotionally disturbed and normal boys, found that the normal group 
placed child figures closer to mother figures than to father or peer 
figures, while emotionally disturbed children did the· reverse. She 
also showed that when emotionally disturbed and normal boys replaced 
pairs of human and geometric figures previously set 15 inches apart, 
the disturbed boys replaced hlUl1an figures farther apart than nonhuman 
figures significantly more frequently than the normal boys. In a simi~ 
lar study, Fisher (1967) showed that emotionally disturbed boys placed 
greater distance between silhouette figures in social schema than nor-
mal boys. In the disturbed group, larger distances were positively 
correlated with the amount of hostility shown by their mothers, as 
measured by the Buss-Durkee Hostility Scale, 
In summary of this group of studies, persons described as extro-
verts, as h,aving subjective feelings of c+oseness, as having high af-
filiati ve needs, and as high in, dominance. needs have closer personal 
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space orientations to others. Nonnal subjects .under role-enactment 
conditions of fear and sorrow have greater personal space requirements 
than under neutral and anger conditions. Normal subjects also show 
greater personal space under conditions of stress. The results regard-
ing persons with shared beliefs with others are inconclusive. These 
studies also indicate that psychiatric patients have greater personal 
space requirements than normals. 
Environmental ~~Setting 
Environment is the least studied of the major determinants of per-
sonal space, L.ittle (1965) compared personai space in waiting rooms, 
1i ving rooms . and street corners. He found that personal space varies 
inversely with the size of the environmental .setting. Sommet'(l962) al-
so found that the larger the room, the closer.people.tend to sit to 
each other. Conversely Trego (1969) instructed subjects to adjust the 
space between two figures projected on a screen. The environmental 
size was manipulated by adjusting cardboard sides. It was found that 
distance increased as did environmental ·size. This contrad,iction in· 
results is possibly due to the difforence in methodologies. The dif-: 
ferential use of personal space in the Trego (1969) study could have 
been because such arrangements were more aesthetically pleasing. 
Little .. (1968) used a doll placement task to examine personal space 
in 19 different social situations. Subjects were male and female stu-
dents .from the United States, Sweden, Greece, Southern Italy and Scot-
land. The results indicated that subjects from the Mediterranean cul-
tures had closer interaction distances when compared to subjects from 
Northern Europe. Results also showed that females ~aintained less 
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distance than males in situations involving intimate transactions or 
unpleasant topics (a mutual friend has just been killed in an accident). 
Sommer (1965), using paper and pencil responses, noted that sub-
jects tended to seat themselves. on the same side of the table as a 
partner involved in joint studying for an exam (ceoperative situation) 
and on the opposite side in a situation involving the .ability to con-
struct jigsaw puzzles (competing situation). When subjects were asked 
why they chose these positions, the .most common·response was conven-
ience. The exact nature of the situations involved in this study is 
hard to determine. It se~ms that factors such as nonverbal cues and 
social protocol could have contributed to the results more than cooper-
ation and competition per se. 
Although the results of this group of studies are inconclusive, 
they suggest that personal space varies inversely as the size of the 
environment, and that the nature of interaction .situations affects per-
sonal space; 
Characteristics .2f the Invading Person 
The characteristics of the invading person have been the most 
thoroughly studied va~iable and was the one under investigation in the 
present study. Several studies have found that persons of the same sex 
maintain greater personal space. distances than do persons of the oppo- . 
site sex~ while males desire greater distance among themselves than fe-
males (Addis, 1966; Beam, 1971; Garfinkel, 1964; Dosey and Meisels, 
1969; Horowitz, Duff and Stratton, 1964; McBride, King and James, 1965; 
Mehrabian, 1968a, 1968b; Rawls, Trego and McGaffey, 1968b; Sommer, 1959; 
Trego, 1969). Elkin ( 1964) found that. females sit side-by-side more 
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often than males. On the other hand, Fromme and Conway (1971) found 
that subjects approached: (1) men closer than women; (2) young men 
closer than young women; (3) young men c+oser than older men; and (4) 
young men closer than a young man with a beard and unconventional dress, 
The reasons for these contradictory results are not clear, 
Friendliness, liking or personal preference are important determi~ 
nants of personal space. Mehrabian (1968b) found that college subjects 
change body posture or location in order to increase personal space 
when the.other imagined person is disliked, He also demonstrated, by 
use of photographs of another person in varying postures, that a person 
will infer whether or not he is liked by the other person from his 
seated posture. A forward-leaning posture more often suggested liking, 
King (1964, 1966) found similar results with personal preference in 
college students, as well as preschool children. Little (1965) ob-
tained the same results with the use of drawi~gs, silhouettes and real 
interaction situations. Although seating posture may.not be equivalent 
to other measures of personal space, variations in seating postures do 
change the personal space balance among indi v:i,duals. Finally 1 Weins tine 
(1967) had elementary school boys estimate from memory the distance be-
tween two silhouette figures. Results showed that subjects who felt 
more accepted by their parents (as .measured by a 12-item questionnaire) 
estimated less distance between figures. 
Another important characteristic of the invading person is his 
perceived status. Mehrabian (1968a) found that seated body orientation 
varied depending on whether the other person was perceived as being of 
higher or lower status than the subject. A forward-leaning posture was 
more often maintained towards a person of perceived higher status, 
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Little's (1968) results indicated that males maintain less personal 
space than females in social situations involving interaction.s with 
authority figures or superiors. Furthermore, Lott and Sommer (1967) 
found that subjects sat further from persons perceived as being either 
higher or lower in status. Closest seating arrangements were with per-
sons perceived as equal in status. Integrating these findings, one 
could hypothesize that less personal space would be associated with 
equal, higher and lower perceived status, respectively. 
Campbell, Kruskal and Wallace (1966), using white subjects, noted 
that increased personal space in regard to Negroes.correlated with neg-
ative attitudes towards minority groups. Addis (1966) obtained similar 
results using stick figures. He asked. his high school and college 
freshman subjects to draw stick figures representing themselves in re-
lation to a standard stick figure called the object figure. Signifi-
cantly greater personal space ,was obtained when the object figure was 
imagined to be a Negro. 
Finally, Addis (1966) found that subjects representing themselves 
by way of stick figures, preferred greater distances from older persons. 
Fronune and Conway (1971) obtained similar results using the field test. 
To summarize this group of studies, it appears ,that greater per-
sonal space is maintained if the person being approached is: (1) of 
the opposite sex; (2) perceived as being either higher or lower in 
status; (3) not previously acquainted with the subject; (4) of a differ-
ent race; (5) moderately older; (6) unconventional in dress; and (7) 
associated with some type of stress. If the person being approached is 
of the same sex, males prefer greater personal space, except in situa-
tions involving interactions .with authority figures. Less persona! 
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space would result, of course, if the opposite of these factors was 
under consideration. In keeping with these findings, the present 
methodology used subjects ,and experimental cohorts that were not pre-
viously acqu~inted and were of the same sex, race, approximate age and 
social status. The intent was to keep these important factors rela-
tively constant~· 
Review of the Literature on Cooperation and Competition 
The literature on cooperation and competition is vast and varied, 
Deutsch (1968b}, in summarizing the factors that have been found to 
contribute to group cohesiveness, hypothesizes a "membership motive" in 
the individual, which is the counterpart of cohesiveness in the group. 
Since cooperation and competition are seen as important factors con-
tributing to the cohesion-dispersion balance, the remainder of the lit-
erature review is devoted to examining these factors. 
This review is generally limited to a type of mixed-motive game 
called the Prisoner's Dilemma Grune, which has been used extensively in 
the study of cooperation and competition, This game seemed appropriate 
for the present study because: (1) it involves a choice of motives on 
the part of the subject; (2) much background work has already been done 
using the Prisoner's Dilemma Grune; (3) game theory can serve as a model 
for human behavior; (4) simulation is an important.way of studying 
human behavior; (5) there is the possibility of clearly separating co-
operative and competitive motives in a somewhat quantitative manner; 
and (6) the possibility for giving controlled feedback exists. 
A mixed motive game is one in which the goals of the players in-
~olved are partially in conflict and partially the same, The Prisoner's 
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Dilemma Game. is of particular interest because if a player attempts to 
maximize his own gain without regarding the consequences for the other 
player, mutual loss is the result. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game co-
operative behavior is rewarded and competitive behavior is punished. 
In real situations, however, the game is played competitively. Gallo 
and Mcclintock (1965) and Rapoport and Orwant (1962), in fairly compre-
hensive reviews, show this to be a very consistent result. 
Figure 1 shows the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
(Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh and Lipetz, 1959). The following set of rules 
concerning the value of different choic~ combinations hold: (1) 
2X1 > x2 + x3 > 2X4; (2) x3 > X1; (3) x3 > x2; and (4) X4 > X2. These 
rules provide for the mixed motivation present in the game, as explained 
below. 
Bl B2 
Al Xl ,Xl X2,X3 
A2 X3,X2 X4,X4 
Figure. 1. General Form of the Prisoner's 
Oil emma Game 
A common Prisoner's Dilemma Game is represented in Figure 2. In 
the game situation, person 1 chooses between rows A1 and A2, while per-
son 2 chooses between columns B1 and B2. Person l's payoffs are deter-
mined by the first number, and person 2's payoffs are determined by the 
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second number in each set. The gains or losses obtained by each person 
are a function of the choices of each. For example, if person 1 chooses 
row A1 and person 2 chooses column B1, that.puts the players in the A1B1 
cell, and they each gain eight points. Had person 1 chosen row A1 and 
person 2 chosen column B2, person 1 would have lost nine points and per-
son 2 would have gained nine points (cell A1B2). Cell A1B1 is the re-
sult of a cooperative strategy on the part of both players, and cell 
A2B2 is the result of a competttive choice o~ the part of both players. 
The remaining two cells reflect a cooperative choice by one player and 
a competitive choice by the other player. 
Person 2 
+8,+8 -9 ,+9 ' 
Person 1 
+9,-9 -8,-8 
Figure 2. Common Monetary or Point Values in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Grune 
Deutsch (1958, 1960a) has attempted to explain the paradox between 
mutually cooperative choices being most beneficial, while competitive 
behavior more often occurs. He reasons that there exists no motivation 
for either player to make a cooperative choice unless mutual trust ex~ 
ists. If one cannot trust, it is safer to choose.minimum rather than 
maximum losses; hence the dilemma of whether or not to trust the other 
17 
person. Deutsch further hypothesized that the most important features 
of a situation in which an individual can either cooperate or compete. 
are: (1) the individual is confronted wi.th an ambiguous path that can 
lead to a perceived beneficial event (gaining points) or harmful event 
(losing points); (2) he sees these events as being contingent upon the 
behavior of the other person; and (3) he perceives the strength of the 
harmful event to be greater than that of the beneficial event. Thus if 
person 1 makes a cooperative choice without knowing whether person 2 
will cooperate or compete, person 1 has made a trusting choice. If not, 
he h~s made a distrustful choice (Deutsch, 1960a). Deutsch feels that 
the Prisoner'. s Dilemma Game is an appropriate experimental procedure 
for studying problems involving trust, cooperation and competition. 
According to Gallo and Mcclintock (1965), four t:ypes of independent 
variables have been the main focus of Prisoner's Dilemma Game research: 
(1) manipulation of the payoff matrices; (2) individual characteristics; 
(3) the strategy of the other player; and (4) possibilities for communi-
cation. These variables influence the degree of cooperation or competi-
tion obt~ined in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The remainder of this re-
view is concerl).ed with locating and examining exactly what types of 
changes in these variables produce increased or decreased cooperation 
and competition. These factors were examined in order to arrive at the 
most appropriate Prisoner's Dilemma Game for the present methodology. 
Manipulations. of the Payoff Matrix 
Manipulations of the payoff .matrix have generally been done in 
three ways: (1) the discrepancy between x3 and x2 has been varied with-
in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game framework; (2) one or more of the game 
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rule~ have been relaxed; or (3) the symmetry of the game has been 
changed. The· second type of manipulation .has usually been done in an 
attempt to encourage cooperation, while the·third investigates unequal 
power on the part of .the players. Both of these manipulations change 
the .Prisoner's Dilemma Game into a different type of mixed-motive game 
that would not be appropriate for the considerations of this study. 
The results of such, studies will be mentioned only when.their res~lts 
are directly comparable to the usua_l Prisoner's Dilemmi;i. Game. 
It should also be mentioned that there is a specific type of manip-
ulation that slightly changes the Prisoner's Dilemma Game matrix, while 
closely following the four rules. This type of manipulation produces 
what is.called a Maximizing Difference Game, and it is contrasted to 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in Figure 3. 
Person 2 Person 2 · 
Bl B2 Bl B2 
Al +8,+8 -9,+9 Al +8,+8 0,+9 
Person 1 Person 1 
A2 +9,-9 -8,-8 A 2 +9, 0 o, 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game Maximizing Difference Game 
'I:·• 
Figure 3. A Comparison of Payoff Matrices for the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game and the Maximizing Difference Game 
This variation has been used to study.the differences among three 
0 
possible m~tives that are hypothesized to be operating in the .Prisoner's 
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Dilemma Grune: (1) maximizing own.gain; (2) maximizing joint gain; and 
(3) maximizing the difference between own and other's gain. A coopera-
tive choice (A1 or B1) in the Prisoner's Dilemma Grune would isolate mo-
tive two, but the motive for competition (A2 or B2 choice) could be 
either motive three or motive one (maximizing own gain by way of mini-
mizing own potential losses). In contrast, the Maximizing Difference 
Game allows one to study the competitive motive in isolation, in that a 
competitive choice (A2 or B2) would now represent only motive three, 
since there is no dal'lger .. of ever obtaining a negative sum. 
A search of the literature.revealed no studies showing any explicit 
differences in results using these two grunes. Since the present study 
was concerned with cooperation and competition per se, the literature 
review consider~d the ~risoner's Dilemma Grune and Maximizing Difference 
Grune to be the srune type of mixed-motive grune. 
Two factors in the manipulation of payoff matrices that have been 
found to produce more competition are an increase in the index of compe-
titive advantage (X:3 - x2) and .. trivial rewards. More cooperation is 
obtained if payoff values are very high. 
Rapoport and Orwant (1962) have developed an index of competitive 
advantage. It is obtained by subtracting the x2 payoff from the x3 pay-
off (see Figure 1). Several studies have enlarged this index and ob-
tained a greater percentage of competitive choices (Ells and Sermat, 
1966, 1968; Komorita and Mechling, 1967; Minas, Scodel, Marlowe and 
Rawson, 1960; Scodel, et al., 1959). Similar results were obtained by 
Steele and Tedeschi (1967) using a variation of the competitive index. 
Th.e Scodel and Minas studies also relaxed rules 2 (X3 > X1) and 4 (X4 > 
X2) of the.Prisoner's Dilemma Grune in order to make competition less 
20 
rewarding (see Figure 1). Rule 4 was relaxed so that competitive 
choices (A2B2) would result in the .worst payoff. Rule 2 was relaxed so 
that no individual advantage would be gained by making a competitive 
choice. Competitive choices were reduced, but they were still more 
ntunerous.than cooperative choices. Scodel (1962) found similar results. 
These studies again demonstrate the competitiveness with which the game 
is normally played. 
Anqther type of manipulation of the payoff matrix involves real 
versus imaginary money. Evans (1964), Gallo, Funk and Levine (1969), 
and Wrightsman (1966) found that subjects made the same percentage of 
competitive responses regardless of the real or imagined conditions. 
A group of studies supports the conclusion that trivial payoffs 
result in more competition. McClintock and McNeel (1966) varied high 
(1 cent) versus low (.1 cent) reward and found more competitive re-
sponses in the low reward conditions. Other studies found similar re-
sults (Ells and Sermat, 1966; McClintock and McNeel, 1964, 1967). 
Gallo (1966) noted the same results in a bargaining game which also pro-
duces cooperative and competitive behavior. In all of the studies men-
tioned above, the high reward conditions were still quite trivial (a 
few cents per.trial). Radlow (1965) increased rewards so that the low-
est cell sum was $6 (A2B2). Subjects played more cooperatively under 
these conditions. Oskamp and Perlman ( 196Sb) found that higher average 
payoffs per trial produced more cooperation. 
Individual Characteristics 
A series of recent studies suggests that competitive individuals: 
(1) score high on the F scale; (2) score high on need aggression and 
autonomy in the Gough Adjective Check List; (3) adhere to more rigid 
ethical standards; and (4) have a non-altruistic orientation. On the 
other hand, cooperative individuals: (1) are internationalistic; (2) 
score high on need abasement; (3} adhere to less rigid ethical stand-
ards; and (4) are altruistic in orientation. The question of how sex 
of the subject affects the percentage of cooperative responses in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Grune remains unanswered. 
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A study by Deutsch (1960b) concluded that high scorers on the F 
scale play more competitively than low scorers. Deutsch's study em-
ployed only two trials, and subjects were told that the simulated "oth-
er" player had made a cooperative response before each of his choices. 
Deutsch felt that a competitive choice on the first trial indicated a 
lack of trust on the part of the subject, while a competitive choice on 
the second trial indicated a lack of trustworthiness on the part of the 
subject. 
Several investigators have studied subjects varying in internation-
alistic versus isolationistic foreign policy belief, and have found that 
the.internationa!istic subjects play the Prisoner's Dilemma Grune more 
cooperatively. Internationalism has been found to correlate negatively 
with high scores on the F scale (Lutzker, 1960). Lutzker (1960) demon-
strated that internationalistic subjects made fewer competitive re-
sponses during a Prisoner's Dilemma Grune than did isolationistic sub-
jects. The internationalists, however, still chose competitively on 
the majority of the trials. A later study by Mcclintock, Harrison, 
Strand and Gallo (1963) confirmed these findings, McClintock, Gallo 
and Harrison (1965) suggest that internationalists may be.more respon-
sive to their opponent's strategy, since they punished previously 
competitive and rewarded previously cooperative behavior by their op-
ponents more often than isolationists. 
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Two studies support the view that subjects who hold less rigid 
ethical beliefs play the Prisoner's Dilemma Game more cooperatively. 
Bixenstine has developed a measure of a personality variable he calls 
"flexible ethicali ty" (Bixenstine, Potash and Wilson, 1963). This scale 
measures the extent to which a hero is approved on moderate ethical 
grounds (N) or on the .basis of extreme and rigid adherence to ethics 
(F). The scale consists of 20 stories, each followed by four comments, 
Subjects were asked to read these stories and judge the comments for 
agreement with their own reaction to the hero's decision. The comments 
had been drawn from particular classes so that a moderate (N) or rigid 
(F) ethical score could be easily obtained. Subjects who scored high 
on the flexible ethicality index (N - F) made more cooperative choices 
than medium or low scorers. A similar relationship was suggested by 
Bixenstine and Wilson (1963). 
The type of outlook an individual takes toward his fellow man seems 
to influence the extent to which he will cooperate or compete. Marlowe 
(1963) found that competitive subjects scored higher than cooperative 
subjects on need aggression (p = .06) and autonomy (p = .03), while co-
operative subjects scored higher on need abasement (p = . 07) and defer-
ence (p = .02), as measured by the Heilbrun adaptation of the Gough 
Adjective Check List. Marlowe, Gergen and Doob (1966) noted that sub-
jects who anticipated further interaction were more exploitative of ego-
tistical opponents than self-effacing opponents. Terhune (1968) studied 
the relation of achievement, affiliation and power motives, as measured 
by the Thematic Apperception Test, He concluded that significant trends 
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were suppressed by the .inclusion of a threat condition which minimized 
motive differences. Altruistic, trusting subjects made more cooperative 
responses than subjects who hold more negative views of htunan nature, 
as measured by Wrightsman's Philosophies of Htunan Nature Scale 
(Wrightsman, 1966). 
Another type of individual characteristic, which is considered to 
be an important variable, is sex. The relationship between sex and co-
operation and competition in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is unclear. 
Rapoport.and Chammah (1965) had male-male, female-female, and mixed 
pairs play a Prisoner's .Dilemma Game for 300 trials. They found that 
male pairs were significantly more cooperative than female pairs. When 
men played against women, however, sex differences seemed to disappear, 
and men responded more like WQmen and vice-v~rsa. A number of other 
studies have also found males to be more cooperative Caixenstine, 
Chambers and Wilson, 1964; Komorita, 1965; Oskamp and Perlman, 1965b), 
These results are in conflict with several studies finding no sex dif-
ferences (Bixenstine, Potash and Wilson, 1963; Lutzker, 1960; Minas, et 
!.!._., 1960; Wilson and Bixenstine, 1962). No explanations for these 
contradictory results are apparent. 
Strategy of the .Other 
The third variable, strategy of the other, has been varied by many 
of the previously cited studies. The findings surrounding this variable 
are unclear, but they suggest that ve:ry high unconditional preplanned 
strategies (those that approach 100 percent consistent cooperative or 
competitive choices) do not elicit cooperation from subjects. Matching 
or systematically varying the strategies does increase cooperation, 
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Several of the experiments referred to used a "simulated other", which 
means that the subject played against a preplanned set of responses fed 
to him by the experimenter, while believing he was actually playing an 
opponent. Bixenstine, Potash and Wilson (1963) used unpatterned pre-
planned strategies of 83 percent cooperative responses for one group 
and 83 percent competitive responses for a second group of subjects, 
These strategies were continued for the first 30 trials. For the next 
60 trials, an 83 percent matching strategy was used, in which subjects' 
responses were matched by the program, No differences were found be-
tween the two groups or between the strategies used on the groups, 
Mcclintock, et al. (1963) used random strategies of 85, 50 and 15 per-
cent cooperative responses and found no differences among the three 
groups. Scodel (1962) used 100 percent cooperative strategy against 
one group. Against a second group, he used a strategy in which the 
first ten trials were competitive and the rest cooperative. He obtained 
no group differences. Gahagan and Tedeschi (1968) varied strategies 
around the 50 percent range and observed no differences between the 
groups. The same general conclusions were reached by,Komorita (1965), 
Minas, et!:!_. (1960) and Sermat (1964). 
There are several exceptions to these findings. Solomon (1960) 
used the following preplanned strategies: (1) 100 percent cooperative;. 
(2) 100 percent competitive; and (3) a cooperative choice on trial one, 
followed by matching the subject's selection. The· game lasted for only 
six trials. Solomon found that t~e third strategy produced more coop-
erative responses than the unconditional strategies, Post-experimental 
interviews indicated that subjects either thought there was no other 
person in the unconditional strategies, or "he" was rather foolish, 
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Bixenstine and Wilson (1963) found that when the systematically varied 
programmed strategy reached as high as 95 percent cooperative or compe-
titive responses, the subjects' responses matched the programmed re-
sponses. Even more effective in producing cooperation is a sequence of 
choices progressing from low to high cooperation. These strategies 
still failed to produce more than SO percent cooperative choices in 
subjects (Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963). Sermat (1967a) significantly 
increased cooperative behavior by using a stategy which consisted of 30 
consecutive cooperative or competitive responses followed by a matching 
strategy for 200 trials. Both groups showed this increase, and in some 
cases subjects chose cooperatively more than 50 percent of the time. 
Finally, Sermat (1967b) found that subjects ,responded more cooperatively 
following a change in preplanned strategies from competitive to cooper-
ative when they thought they were.playing against a free-responding 
partner, as opposed to an absent partner or one committed to a previous 
strategy. 
In attempting to understand why very high unconditional preplanned 
strategies do not elicit cooperation, motivation seems to be an import-
ant factor. Such a conclusion is supported by the work of Bruning and 
Mettee (1966) using a .. different type of task. The task was. to predict 
the outcome of a simulated horse race. Cooperative subjects were told 
their scores would be summed, while competitive subjects were told their 
individual score would be added and compared to others. By way of ma-
nipulated feedback, they concluded that persistent winners or losers are. 
less motivate~ than those who perform under conditions in which the out-
come is more in doubt. 
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Possibilities for Communication 
The fourth major variable, possibilities for communication, brings 
about more consistent findings. The more opportunity there is for com-
munication, the more cooperation will result; Loomis (1959) used the 
Prisoner's .Dilemma Gaine to study the effects. of communication on coop-
erative and competitive choices. Half of his subjects received, while 
the other half sent, standardized notes expressing expectation, inten-
tion, retaliation, absolution or mixtures of these. Subjects who sent 
or received messages, perceived more mutual trust than subjects who were 
unable to communicate. The level of trust varied with the complexity 
of the message allowed. The more complete me~sages resulted in higher 
levels of trust. A number of other st~dies have obtained similar re-
sults (Evans, 1964; Horai and Tedeschi, 1969; Radlow and Weidner, 1966; 
Scodel, et.~., 1959; Swensson, 1967; Terhune, 1968). Pilisuk and 
Skolnick (1968) and Tedeschi, Lindskold, Horai and Gahagan (1969) found 
that a conciliatory strategy with honest prior announcement of moves 
led to higher ainounts of cooperation after subjects .had been given.the 
motivational set to maximize their own gain. Gahagan and Tedeschi 
(1968) found increased amounts of cooperation if the subject felt he 
could predict the strategy of the other, which was a preplanned matching 
strategy in this case. 
Other Important Variables .~ the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
In addition to these four major variables, other important factors 
hav~.been less thoroughly studied and will be briefly mentioned. Pre-
vious interaction can influence choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
Oskamp and Perlman (1965b) found that friendship ranging from 
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unacquainted to fairly friendly has no effect on Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game responses. On the other hand, close friendship may produce either 
high amounts of cooperation or competition (Oskamp and Perlman, 1965a), 
Unrewarding prior dyadic experiences (preplanned competitive opponent) 
in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game resulted in more competition in a second 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Marlowe, Gergen and Doob, 1966; Mcclintock and 
McNeel, 1967; Scodel, 1962). Harrison and McClintock (1965) compared 
subjects who were rewarded during a reaction-time game with subjects 
who had no previous dyadic experience. They reported that previously 
rewarded subjects exhibited a higher percentage of cooperative re-
sponses. 
In other studies, Rapoport and Dale (1966) reported that subjects 
cooperate more at first and compete more on the last trial if they know 
how man:y trials there will be. They call these phenomena the "end" and 
"start" effects. Mcclintock and McNeel (1966) and Messick and Mc-
Clintock (1968) noted that if opponent's score feedback is presented 
during the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,, more competition will result, The 
latter investigators also found that. labeling the other player as op-
ponent or partner made no difference in game playing behavior. If the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game matrix is presented in non-matrix fonn, more 
cooperation .results (Evans and Crumbaugh, 1966). Also subjects who 
find themselves arbitrarily behind at the beginning of play cooperate 
less often than their ahead partners (Marwell, Ratcliff and Schmitt, 
1969). In addition, Oskamp and Perlman (1965b) reach the following 
conclusions: (1) level of cooperation is sensitive to the amount of 
social interaction at th.e beginning of the experiment; (2) higher levels 
of cooperation are more easily achieved with subjects from smaller 
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colleges as opposed to large universities; (3) previous public commit-
ment to the nonn that cooperation in the game is desirable results in 
more cooperation; and (4) instructions labeling the experiment as deal-
ing with cooperation and competition have no effect. 
The next few studies in this review deal with variables that were 
considered particularly important to the present study. Deutsch (1960a) 
manipulated cooperation and competition in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
by varying pregame.instructions. The different sets of instructions 
emphasized the three possible motives that could be operating in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The instructions called for maximizing own 
gain, maximizing join gain and maximizing the difference between own 
and other's gain, The sets were called individualistic, cooperative 
and competitive, respectively, Results were as follows: . ( 1) the in-
dividualistic set group cooperated anywhere from 21 to 77 percent of 
the time; (2) the cooperative set group cooperated on 78 to 97 percent 
of the responses; and (3) the competitive set group cooperated from 13 
to 36 percent of the time. Since the present study was interested in 
obtaining high amounts of .cooperation between the subject and one co-
hort, as .well as high amounts of competition between the subject and 
another cohort, the second and third sets of pregame instructions were 
used to induce the appropriate effects. 
The present research was also conceTJ?,ed with measuring postgame 
attitudes involving partners and opponents. Wilson, Chun and Kayatani 
(1965) had two teammates jointly choose a strategy of play against the 
opposing team, while playing the same Prisoner's Dilemma Game between 
themselves to determine the division of the winnings, if any. Subjects 
were 40 college students, and the ,game· lasted for 20 trials. The 
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results showed that partners received more cooperative choices than 
their opponents (p < .00~). After the .20 trials, all subjects were 
rated by each other on personality, sociometric, ability and motive 
traits. Positive ratings on motives such as kind, cooperative and gen-
erous increased for partners (p <.OS), and decreased for opponents 
(p < .OS). Examples of the personality traits that were used are anx-
ious, dependable and gullible. Some of the sociometric traits are 
likable, attractive, and desirable as a friend; while ability traits 
are exemplified by capable, efficient and intelligent. Subjects rated 
on a 9-point scale each of the other three persons .on 22 .total traits. 
In a follow-up study using emotionally disturbed boys 9-16 years of age, 
partners again received significantly more cooperative choices than op-
ponents (p < .001). However, postgame ratings on traits failed to dis-
tinguish ingroup and outgroup (Wilson and Rickard, 1968). The different 
results regarding ratings on the traits in these two studies can prob-
ably be accounted for by the difference in the subjects' ages and emo-
tional instability. The present study attempted to show how rating on 
traits such as those used in these two .studies relates to physical per-
sonal space. 
Zajonc and Marin (1967), using two-man teams in a Prisoner's Di-
lemma Gl;lllle, investigated the effect on interpersonal attitudes of win-
ning or losing. One member of each team, by way of programmed outcomes, 
always decreased the .likelihood of his team gaining poi~ts, while the 
other team member always increased that likelihood, The experiment was 
set up so that one member of each team played one member of the other 
team, while their teammates watched the progression of the game. After 
a fixed number of trials, the observing teammates would play one 
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another. The "winner" of one team always played the "loser" of the 
other team. The results showed that successful members had more favor-
able attitudes towards their opponents than their teammates, Pylyshyn, 
Agnew and Illingworth (1966) found that two-man teams tended to make 
more cooperative responses than individuals. In a competitive game 
other than.the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, losing or winning of a two-man 
team was manipulated (Wilson and Miller, 1961). It was found that sue-
cess and failure of the team interacted with ratings of opponent or 
teammate on 27 traits. Similar results were found by Rabbie and 
Horwitz (1969). 
In summary of these studies, it appears that a greater degree of 
cooperation can.be obtained by: (1) some preyious acquaintance or 
social interaction prior to the game; (2) presenting the game in non-
matrix fonn; (3) giving the subjects .a cooperative motivational set; 
and (4) playing the game with a "partnei:". More competition can be en-
gendered by: (1) having very close friends play the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game; (2) having opponents' scores presented; (3) giving subjects a 
competitive motivational set; and (4) playing the game with an "oppo-
nent". 
Summary: Cooperative and Competitive Variables in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game 
The important cooperative and competitive variables are represented 
in Tables I and II. Of these variables, the most important and influ-
/ 
ential appears to be motivational set (pregame instructions), All of 
the factors, however, seem to fit into the cohesion-dispersion scheme 
mentioned earlier. Factors increasing cooperation in the Prisoner's 
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TABLE I 











Very high rewards 
Altruistic subjects 
Allow communication . 
Previously acquainted 
subjects 
Non-matrix form of game 
Cooperative instructions 
Use of "partners" 
Subjects with low scores 









(9) Subjects with internation- (9) 
alistic foreign policy 
beliefs 
(10) Subjects with less rigid 
ethical beliefs 
( 11) Matching subjects', 
strategy 
(12) Subjects from small 
colleges 







Oskarnp and Perlman, 1965b; 
Radlow, 1965 
Wrightsman, 1966 
Evans, 1964; Horai and Tedeschi, 
1969; Loomis, 1959; Pilisuk 
and Skolnick, 1968; Radlow and 
Weidner, 1966; Scodel, et al,, 
1959; Swensson, 1967; Tedeschi, 
et !.!_. , 1969; Terhune, 1968 
Os~arnp and Perlman, 196Sb 
Evans and Crurnbaugh, 1966 
Deutsch, 1960a 
Wilson, Chun and Kayatani, 1965; 
Wilson and Rickard, 1968 
Deutsch, 1960b 
Lutzker, 1960; Mcclintock, et 
al., 1965; McClintock, et""'"il,, 
1963 --
Bixenstine, et al., 1963; 
Bixenstine""'"incr-Wilson, 1963 
Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963; 
Serrnat, 1967a 
Oskarnp and Perlman, 1965b 
Marlowe, et al .• , 1966; Mcclin-



























Less than·100% consistent 
"other" strategy 
Allow no communication 
No prior acquaintance 
of subjects 
Present opponent's score 
Competitive instructions 
Subjects with high scores 
on F scale 
Subjects with isolation-
istic foreign policy 
beliefs 
Use of "opponents" 
Subjects with more rigid 
ethical beliefs 



















Ells and Sermat, 1968; Komorita 
and Mechling, 1967; Minas, et 
al., 1960; Scodel, et al.,~ 
1959; Scodel, 1962;-Steele and 
Tedeschi, 196 7 
Evans, 1964; Gallo, et al,, 
1969; Mcclintock and McNeel, 
1966; Wrightsman, 1966 
Wrightsman, 1966 
Bixenstine, et al,, 1963; Gaha-
gan and Tedeschi, 1968; Komo-
rita, 1965; McClintock, et 
~·, 1963; Minas, et ~.-,-1960 
Evans, 1964; Horai and Tedeschi, 
1969; Loomis, 1959; Pilisuk 
and Skolnick, 1968; Radlow and 
Weidner, 1966; Scodel, et al,, 
19£:9; Swens,son, 1967; Tedeschi, 
et ~,, 1969; Terhune, 1968 
Oskamp and Perlman, 1965b 
McClintock and McNeel, 1966; 
Mcclintock and McNeel, 1968 
Deutsch, 1960a 
Deutsch, l~ 
Lutzker, 1960; McClintock, et 
al,, 1963; McClintock, et al,, 
1965 
Wilson, Chun and Kayatani, 1965; 
Wilson and Rickard, 1968 
Bixenstine, et al,, 1963; 
Bixenstine""""'i'ncr-Wilson, 1963 
Oskamp and Perlman, 1965b 
Marlowe, et al., 1966; McClintock 
and McNeel-,-1967; Scodel, 1962 
Dilemma Game woul~ probably increase cohesion when applied to many 
everyday situations, while competitive factors would likely increase 
dispersion. 
Effects £!_ Cooper~tion and Competition ~Attitudes 
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In addition to looking at personal space, the present study at-
tempted to measure differences in psychological distance that may ac-
company personal space differences in regard to a partner or opponent. 
Psychological distance can be defined as the feeling or attitude one 
has towards another person. Feelings of warmth, closeness and liking 
would be associa1;.ed with a close psychological distance, while their 
opposites would suggest greater psychological distance. The general 
finding of the following studies is that cooperative group tasks result 
in more favorable ingroup interpersonal attitudes and relationships. 
Although they did not use a noncompetitive control condition, 
Singer, Radloff and Wark (1963) found increased favorableness (as meas-
ured by a 7-point rating scale) towa.rds teammates following competition. 
Using appropriate controls, Myers (1962) had three-man rifle teams com-
pete with each other over a period of five weeks. A semantic differen-
tial type scale showed that teams that competed with each other had 
greater internal cohesiveness than did teams competing against a fixed, 
unchanging standard. 
Similar studies in cooperative and competitive settings have also 
found increased ingroup cohesiveness. Bass and Dunteman (1963) had a 
group of eight or nine men collaborate with a second group of similar 
size. Their task was to develop a plan for more efficient operation of 
an engineering corporation. This plan was to be placed in competition 
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with another plan developed by a second pair of collaborating groups. 
Rank order evaluations of each of the groups were obtained from the sub-
jects ,before, during and after the .competit~on. The results showed 
that: (1) all outgroups were consistently underrated; (2) until the 
"winner" was announced, members rated their own group as best; (3) 
groups who arbitrarily became allies increased in evaluation at the ex-
pense of those forced into competition; and (4) ratings were higher if 
the .collaborators were allied in victory. 
Gottheil (1955) used a cooperative and competitive essay writing 
con~est in classes of 13-14 year old grade school boys. He found that 
individuals who were.members of the cooperating group perceived this 
group in a mor~ favorable light. This was not the case in control or 
competit~ve groups. Individuals in cooperative groups were also more 
accepting of other people in general, apparently as a r.esult of the co-
operating experience; A similar type of task,; involving cooperating 
and competing in psychology laboratory assignments, was. used by Julian 
and Perry (1967). These subjects.were college students, and the results 
indicat~d that the most favorable interpersonal relations were .. among 
the .cooperative group .members. Julian, Bishop and Fiedler (1966) found 
the same results using combat engineering squads that competed against 
each other in their.training and garrison duties. 
Grossack (1954) used college students divided into cooperative and 
competitive groups. Their task was to consider appropriate treatment 
procedures for a delinquent boy as described in a case study. The re-
sults showed that cooperative groups manifested significantly more co-
hesive behavior tha.D; the competitive groups •. Similar conclusi.ons were 
reached by Deutsch (1949, 1968a) and Levy (1953). Back (1951) found 
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that group cohesiveness could be increased by,stressing to subjects how 
much they would like each other, how important it was for their group 
to do well on the task or how prestigious th.e group was. 
Finally, Raven and Eachus (1963) used a cooperative task that in-
volved three subjects grasping the sides of an equilateral triangle and 
making it.level with the ground as quickly as possible, In each side 
was a carpenter's level, and balance was achieved when all three sides 
were balanced at the same time. The cooperative task was termed a test 
of "group intelligence", while the competitive task was to see which 
individual could level his own side most.quickly. Sociometric data 
showed that coalitions fonned more quickly in cooperative groups. A 
replication of this study by Crombag (1966), using Dutch students, found 
faster coalition formation in the competitive groups. Coalition in 
these studies was a function of the amount and kind of communication 
that took place between the subjects. Crombag suggested that his re-
sults were different possibly because overt striving for leadership in 
the competitive group is less acceptable for Dutch than American stu-
dents. Possibly Dutch students attain leadership in groups by the .for ... 
mation of .informal coalitions. 
The conclusion from this group of studies is that cooperative tasks 
and outgrqup competition produce ingroup cohesiveness, while ingroup 
competition produces more dispersion. Several extensive reviews of the 
literature.result in .the same conclusion (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; 
Crombag, 1966; Hare, 1962; McGrath and Altman, 1966). In terms of the 
cohesion-dispersion schema discussed at.the beginning of this chapter~ 
ingroup cooperation should result in more favorable attitudes towards 
one's partner (more cohesiveness). More favorable attitudes should be 
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closely associated with cl.oser psychological distance, which should be 
reflected by closer personal space orientation to one's partner rather 
than opponent. 
Summary of the Problem 
The concept of personal space was seen as developing from a balance 
of cohesive and dispersive tendencies present in man and other animals. 
Cohesive tendencies are those which bring individuals together in coop-
erative, mutually beneficial situations in which basic aggressive urges 
are less important. Dispersive tendencies keep individuals apart and 
interacting on a less cooperative basis. It was concluded that personal 
space was a type of balance between cohesive and dispersive forces, 
Not· until recently has personal space been studied scientifically 
The most popular methods of measurement have been the field and pencil . 
and paper techniques. Among the most important factors influencing 
personal space are the characteristics of the person being approached. 
Although it has never been demonstrated, it was hypothesized that if 
the ,person being approached was seen as a cooperative partner or a com-
petitive opponent, different personal space orientations would result. 
It was.concluded that field and seating methods of measurement would be 
used. 
The literature review on cooperation and competition suggested that 
the Prisoner's .Dilemma Game would provide a.thoroughly studied and some~ 
what quantitative procedure for producing cooperation and competition. 
There are a number of factors in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game that can 
be manipulated to produce greater or lesser amounts of cooperation or 
competition .. It was concluded that pregame motivational instructions 
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are the most powerful factors. The literature also showed that cooper-
ation and competition can affect one's attitude towards his partner or 
opponent. The most frequent measure was ratings on traits. Attitudes 
were seen to be similar to p~ychological distance$ in that a negative 
attitude would suggest greater psychological distance, Psychological 
distance was hypothesized to be part of what contributes to the overall 
balance present in personal space. It was further hypothesized that 
cooperation and competition would produce greater psychological distance 
as measured by interpersonal attitudes. 
The present study had subjects play a simultaneous cooperative and 
competitive Prisoner's Dilemma Grune with experimental cohorts, A neu-
tral cohort was .used as a control. Immediately following the game, 
personal space measures were taken using approach, seating and ques-
tionnaire measures, It was predicted that subjects would show a closer 
personal space orientation to the cooperative as opposed to the competi-
tive cohort. The personal space orientation to the neutral cohort was 
predicted to be intennediate~ 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
Subjects 
The experimental subjects were 18 male volunteers from the men's 
dormitory on the Oklahoma State University campus~ during the summer 
session of .1970. All subjects were Caucasian, had not had a psychology 
course more advanced than. elementary psychology,and ranged in age from 
18 to 37 year~, with a mean of 21. 3. years. The only prior information 
the subjects had about the experiment was that there would be a good 
possibility of winning some money, 
Experimental Cohorts 
Three experimental cohorts played.the cooperative, competitive and 
neutral roles. The ages of the cohorts were 21, 23 and 27 years~ with 
a mean of 23.7 years. A male assistant~ 38 years.of age, was used to 
help with the experimental pr~cedure in general, All cohorts and the 
assistant participated in the present study as part of the requirements 
qf a graduate level psychology course. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma G~e and Motivational Sets 
The treatment in the present study consisted of having each subject 
play concurrent cooperative and competitive Prisoner's Dilemma Games 
with two experimental cohort~. An additional cohort, identified as 
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scorekeeper (see tally sheet, Appendix A), was used as a control, The 
payoff matrices for the game are illustrated in Figure 4, 
Person 2 
B1 (blue) B2 (red) 
A1 (blue) (+ 9¢,+ 9¢) (-10¢,+10¢) 
Person 1 
A2 (red) (+10¢,-10¢) (- 9¢,- 9¢) 
Figure 4. Prisoner's Dilemma Game Payoff Matrix 
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game moti v-ational instructions were taken 
from Deutsch· (1960a). The cooperative motivational set was induced by 
the following set of instructions: 
Before. you start playing the game, let me emphasize that .· 
in playing the game you should consider yourself to be part-
ners. You' re interested in your partner's welfare as well as 
in your own. You do have an interest in whether your partnel;' 
wins or loses, You do care how he does and he does care how 
you do. His feelings make a difference to you and your feel-
ings make a difference to him. You want. to win as much money 
as you can for yourself and you do want him to win.· He feels 
exactly the same way, he wants you to win too. In other 
words, you each want to win money and you also want your 
partner to win too.· 
The competitive motivational set was induced by these instructions: 
Before you start playing the game, let me emphasize that 
in playing the game your motivation should be to win as much 
money as you can.for yourself and also to do better than the 
other person. You want to make rather than lose money but 
you also want to come out ahead of the other person. Assume 
that you don't know each other and that you'll never see 
e~ch other again, His feelings don't make any difference to 
you.and your feelings don't make any difference to him, Ex-
cept that you're out to beat him and he's out to beat you. 
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Procedure 
Several hours prior to the arrival of the subject, experimental 
cohorts were given: (1) their cooperative, competitive or neutral role 
assignment; (2) the trial numbers on which they were to deviate from 
their cooperative or competitive strategy; and (3) the.seat in which 
they were to sit for the seating distance measure of personal space. 
All of these assignments were randomly determined. The cooperative, 
competitive and neutral roles were balanced so that each of the three 
cohorts played each role a total of six times, The cooperative cohort 
played a random cooperative strategy 90% of the time, while the competi-
tive cohort played a random cooperative strategy 20% of the time 
(Deutsch, 1960a). The experimenter also randomly predetermined where 
the subject would sit while playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
The game apparatus was set up in a room (Room A) that was 10 x 12 
feet. The only furniture in the room was a card table and four chairs, 
Plywood dividers, 12 inches high and 36 inches long, served to make a 
compartment for each of the four individuals sitting at the table (see 
Appendix B), The dividers were high enough to hide the participant's 
hands, but not their faces. Platforms 6 inches square were placed on 
the dividers between the compartment to be utilized by the subject 
(designated Win Appendix.B) and every other compartment. Within each 
compartment was a dittoed representation of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
(see Figure 4). Compartment W contained 60 red and 60 blue poker chips, 
while two of the remaining compartments.contained 30 re<l and 30 blue 
poker chi?s, In the remaining compartment was the response talley sheet. 
and a pencil, 
As each participant arrived, the experimenter asked his first name, 
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allowed him to choose a seat in Room A and requested that he not talk 
beyond this point except to ask the experimenter questions regarding 
the exp&rimenta1 procedure. After all cohorts and the subject had ar-
rived, the experimenter introduced everyone and explained that since 
all participants would not have an equal chance to win money, numbers 
would be drawn to determine playing positions. The experimenter seated 
the subject in position W and seated the cohorts in randomly predeter-
mined positions among the three remaining seats~ 
The game was then explained by a set of standardized instructions 
(see Appendix C). In these instructions; several examples were given 
to insure the fact that the subject.understood the game, The payoff 
values were understood to he in terms of.pennies. The cooperative, com-
petitive and neutral instructions were the~ given to the appropriate 
pair. The set of instructions that was given first was randomized, 
The experiment was briefly explained as being concerned with studying 
each of the cohorts' reactions to the subject as a cooperative, compe-
titive and ne~tral person, respectively. 
Both the cooperative and competitive games were played for 30 
trials. Participants made their cooperative or competitive choices 
from their stack of red and blue poker chips in which red represented a 
competitive choice and blue represented a cooperative choice. Each 
choice was made simultaneously by the subject and his partner or oppo-
nent behind the 12 inch high dividers, Participants held the poker 
chips concealed in their hands until the experimenter gave a signal. 
At the signal, both participants placed the-poker chip in a separate 
stack on the platform between them. The neutral cohort then marked 
these choices .on the tally sheet. The experimenter randomly selected 
cooperative and competitive games for trial 1. Thereafter the trials 
alternated between the two games. 
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At the .end of the games, before any monetary gains or losses were 
established, measures were taken using the three personal space tech-
niques. The subject and one of the randomly predetermined cohorts were 
taken into Room B (see Appendix D), which was 17 feet x 16 feet, 6 
inches. A circle of 9 desk chairs was placed approximately in the cen-
ter of the room, The subject was positioneq in the southwest corner 
and the cohort ~as positioned in the southeast corner of the room, Ring 
electrodes from a GSR machine (Model 12-13 T, manufactured by the 
Marietta Apparatus Company, Marietta, Ohio) were attached to the first 
and third fingers of the cohort's right hand, It was explained that 
the purpose of these electrodes was .to measure the cohort's. response to 
the subject's approach. The subject was then asked to walk toward the 
cohort and the approach measure of personal space (see below) was 
recorded. 
After the approach measure of personal space was taken, the sub-
ject was asked to resume his original position. The cohort was asked 
to take a pencil and three sociometric questionnaires, from a stack on 
a small rounq table in the center of the circle of chairs ·(see Appendix 
C). The circle was composed of 9 desk chairs placed approximately in 
the center of the room and equally spaced to form a circle 8 feet in 
diameter. The cohort then sat in a randomly predetermined seat and was 
asked not to look at the questionnaires until told to do so, 
The remaining cohorts were brought into the room one at a time, 
and the same procedure was repeated. The experimenter told each remain-
ing cohort to "leave space'' between himself and the other seated 
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participants, since they would be completing questionnaires on one 
another. The purpose of "leaving space" was to seat the _cohorts so 
that two chairs were vacant on either side of each. cohort. The experi-
menter made certain that the subject was seated last and recorded his 
pos~tion as the seating distance measure of personal space, The cohort 
by.whom the subject sat was.asked to move sq that one chair remained 
between him and the subject before the que~tionnaires were completed. 
All participants were. asked to complete one ·of the sociometric 
questionnaires (see Appendix E) on each of the other three seated play-
ers. After the sociometric questionnaires were completed, question-
naires desig~ed to determine the subject's perception of his role in 
the experiment were also completed by th_e subject and each of the co-
horts. (see Appendix F) • The subject was·· then debriefed and paid one 
dollar plus his winnings from the Prisoner's Dilemma Garneo The average 
winnings were sligh,tly over 52 cents. 
Response Measures 
Two measures of actual personal space and one sociometric question-
naire were taken as response measures. One measu~e of personal space 
was. th_e simple approach technique used by, Rawls, ~ !.!.· ( 196.Ba); while 
the other. was a more. natural s~ating distance measure. These measures 
were always taken in the following sequence~ approach, seating, ques-
tionnaire. 
The- approach measure of personal space had the subject approach 
each of the .cohorts one at a time. The cohort was wired to a GSR ma-. 
chine that was.sl.lpposedly measuring his responses to the subject's ap-
proach. The subject was told only to walk toward each cohort. The 
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personal space measure was the distance that the subject stopped fro~ 
each cohort, as measured by tape strips placed along a wall 9 inches 
apart. The tape·strips were ostensibly there to tape electrical wires 
together, Distance was recorded to the nearest 4 1/2 inches. The ex-
perimenter observed the subject's approach from a desk chair placed 8 
feet to the cohort's right and was supposedly observing the GSR machine, 
In the seating distance measure, experimental cohorts were seated 
at randomly,predetennined positions equidistant from each other so as 
to fonn an equilateral triangle. Between each cohort, two remaining 
vacant chairs were positioned so as to form a circle, The subject then 
chose among the remaining chairs. The number of chairs from each of 
the cohorts W34!!. taken as the measure of personal space, 
The sociometric questionnaire consisted of rating each of the . 
three other participants on a group of 24 traits, The rating was done 
on a 7-point semantic differential type scale~ There were 4 personality 
traits, 6 sociometric traits, 5 intellectual traits and 9 motive traits, 




A t.test was done on the number of competitive choices the subjects 
m~de toward their cooperative and competitive opponents. The one-tailed 
test was.calculated to be 3.922 and is significant with p < .0005 
(Winer, 1962} •... These results are consistertt with those of Deutsch 
(1960a) and suggest that the treatment was quite effective. Table III 
shows that treatment means for all analyses were in the predicted order 
and direction. In each case a lower total reflects.less personal space 
or psychological distance. 
TABLE III 
TREATMENT MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PERSONAL SPACE 
MEASURES AVERAGED ACROSS COHORT GROUPS 



































7. 00 . 
Cooper- Compe- Neutral at ion titian 
22.99 23.35 27,56 
6.40 4.96 4.62 
4, 71 6.11 4.73 
7. 71 10.41 10.87 
8 .15 . 8.07 1L26 
9.29 6.62 8. 73 . 
1.37 0.89 1.67 
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Since the distances in the seating measure of personal space were 
not independent of each other, seating data were analyzed using the 
.Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 1956). The 
sums of ranks for each treatment condition were as follows: coopera-
tive 27, competitive 42, and neutral 42. The x2 test statistic was 
r 
calculated to be 20.26, which was significant (p < .0005). 
· The remaining measures were analyzed using an analysis of variance 
for a two-factor experiment with repeated measures on one factor 
(Winer, 1962). . Factor,one represented the cooperative, competitive 
and neutral cohort roles, and the other factor represented a cohort 
group factor. A group was formed by all subjects who had the same co-
operative, competitive and neutral cohorts. Since the groups on factor 
two were not completely independent, the more conservative Greenhouse-
Geisser £. ratio, as well as the ordinary !_ test was used, 
The approach measure of personal space showed no significant treat-
ment or interaction effects. The results of the analysis of variance 
for the approach data are shown in Table IV. 
Table V shows the results of the analysis of variance for the 
questionnaire measure of personal space. No significant treatment or 
interaction effects were obtained using either the regular or conserva-
tive F test. 
Since questionnaire data have never been compared directly to per-
sonal space measures utilizing actual physical distances, these data 
were also analyzed after being broken.down into the four subclassifica-
tions, The purpose of these further analyses was to examine the specif-
ic types of traits that are more closely related to physical personal 
space. The results of the analysis of variance for the ability traits 
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TABLE IV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE APPROACH MEASURE OF PERSONAL SPACE 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 2025.0000 17 
A (cohort group) 261.0000 5 52.2000 
Subjects within groups 1764.0000 12 147.0000 
Within Subjects 526.5000 36 
B (treatment) 47.2500 2 23.6250 
AB 83.2500 10 8,3250 
B x subjects within groups 396.0000 24 16.5000 
TABLE V 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
MEASURE OF PERSONAL SPACE 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 5909.7037 17 
A (cohort group) 402.8148 5 80.5629 
Subjects within groups 5506.8889 12 458.9074 
Within Subjects 9311. 3334 36 
B (treatment) 872,9259 2 436,4629 
AB 2653;,9630 10 265.3963 
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are presented in Table VI. No significant treatment or interaction ef-
fects,were found using either the regular or conservative F test. 
TABLE VI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE ABILITY TRAITS 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 391. 2037 17 
A (cohort group) 16.0925 5 3.2185 0. 1029 
Subjects within groups 375 .1112 12 31.2592 
Within Subjects 628.0000 36 
B (treatment) 51.1481 2 25.5740 1.3454 
AB 120.6297 10 12.0629 0.6345 
B x subjects within groups 456.2222 24 19.0092 
Table VII shows the results of the analysis of variance for the 
motive traits. No significant treatment or interaction effects were 
found using either the regular or conservative F test. 
The analysis of variance for the personality traits is shown in 
Table VIII. No significant treatment or interaction effects were found 
using either the regular or conservative F test. 
Table IX presents the analysis of variance for the sociometric 
traits. The treatment effects approach significance (p < .10) for the 
regular, but not the conservative F test. The interaction effects 
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TABLE VII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE MOTIVE TRAITS 
Source SS df· MS F 
Between Subjects 1436.5926 17 
. A (cohort group) 203.2593 5 40.6518 0.3955 
Subjects within groups 1233.3333 12 102.7777 
Within Subjects 1661.3334 36 
B (treatment) U2.9260 2 56,4630 1. 0631 
AB 273.7407 10 27.4740 0.5172 
B x Sl.\bjects .within groups 1274.6667 24 53.1111 
TABLE VIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE PERSONALITY TRAITS 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 209.2036 17 
A (cohort group) 25.2036 5 5.0407 0.3287 
Subjects within groups 184,0000 12 15.3333 
Within Subjects 396.0000 36 
B (treatment) 14.0369 2 7.0184 0.6429 
AB 119.9631 10 11.9963 1.0989 
B x subjects within groups 262.0000 24 10.9166 
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TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE SOCIOMETRIC TRAITS 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 464.6667 17 
A (cohort group) 54.8889 5 10.9777 0.3214 
Subjects within groups 409.7778 12 34.1481 
Within Subjects 826.6667 36 
* B (treatment) 92 .1111 2 46.0555 3.0856 
*'* 
AB 3~..,3334 10 37.6333 2.5214 
B x subjects within groups 358.2222 24 14.9259 
* p < .10; regular E. ratio, but not Greenhouse-Geisser E. ratio, 
** p < .10, regular and Greenhouse-Geisser F ratio. 




The present study was designed to investigate the influence of co-
operation and competition on the use of personal space. Three different 
measures of personal space were employed: approach, seating and ques-
tionnaire. Only the seating measure produced statistically significant 
results; however, these results were quite striking in that only one 
subject chose to sit next to the competitive cohort. Neither the ap-
proach nor the questionnaire rating data reached statistical signifi-
cance, although there were trends in the predicted direction. Overall, 
the basic·hypothesis of this study, that personal space lessens as a 
function of in~reased cooperation, may be said to have been supported. 
The present results are consjstent with those of Deutsch (1960a) 
in suggesting that cooperative and competitive instructions used with 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game a+e useful experimental tools for producing 
and studying cooperative and competitive behaviors. The results are 
inconsistent with th.ose of Dosey and Meisels (1969), who found an ap-
proach measure to be more sensitive than a seating measure. There are 
several methodological differences that may account for this inconsist-
ency. Dosey and Meisels had subjects approach each other in the ap-
proach situation, and responses of the subject were seen as the object 
of study. The present design had subjects approach a cohort who was 
wired to a GSR machine, and cohort responses were seen as the object of 
C\ 1 
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study. This deception may have made the subjects feel they had to 
"help" the experimenter and approach each cohort beyond the most com-
fortable, more natural distance. Any treatment effects could have been 
lessened by the perceived demands of the experiment. In addition, the 
seating distance in the Dosey and Meisels study was measured in rela-
tion to the experimenter. The experimenter may have been perceived as 
being different in status; that is, previous studies have shown that 
perceived status influences personal space (Little, 1968; Lott and 
Sommer, 1967; Mehrabian, 1968a). The seating situation also involved 
the subject choosing among three chairs placed at a table, as opposed 
to the circular arrangement in the present study. The circular arrange-
ment presented the subject with a forced choice, and this may have in-
creased the sensitivity of this measure. Finally, Dosey and Meisels 
administered a Body Contact questionnaire immediately prior to the 
seating measure, which may have aroused some anxiety in the subjects. 
The trends in the present questionnaire data are consistent with 
the large body of research indicating that more positive ingroup feel-
ings are associated with cooperation, as opposed to competition 
(Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Crombag, 1966; Hare, 1962; McGrath and 
Altman, 1966). The fact that sociometric trait ratings showed the 
largest difference is inconsistent with the results of Wilson, Chun and 
Kayatani (1965), in which ratings on motive traits were significantly 
different. The possible reasons for this inconsistency are not clear. 
The trends in the questionnaire data also lend marginal support to a 
number of studies which find generally positive feelings are associated 
with less personal space (Fisher, 1967; Gottheil, Corey and Paredes, 
1968; King, 1964, 1966; Little, 1965; Mehrabian, 1968a), 
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The present results provide support for the theory that coopera-
tion and competition are factors which contribute to the overall balance 
of cohesive and dispersive forces. In particular, cooperation seems to 
be a cohesive force, while competition can be seen as a dispersive force 
in relation to the competitor. Since cooperation and competition can 
be seen as factors contributing to the cohesive-dispersive balance, 
these results also provide some support for those theories of behavior 
pathology which see disordered behavior as resulting from a change in a 
stable equilibrium .. That is, if an individual's personal space is in-
vaded in the absence of positive feelings like those produced by coop-. 
eration, the cohesive-dispersive equilibrium is changed, and disordered 
behavior may result, Many psychiatric disturbances in Western civiliza-
t~on are hypothesized to have , their etio,logies centered around· sexual 
and aggressive feelings - cooperation and competition in e~treme forms. 
Cooperat:i,on and competition, in all their varying intensities, can 
clearly be viewed as factors that might change the equilibrium of a 
stable personality. 
There are several implications.of the results .of the present study. 
First, personal space is a useful interactional measure, Secondly, 
cooperation and competition do appear to be factors that influence per-
sonal space. Thirdly, deception in the ,use of approach measures may 
add extraneous variables to these measurement situations. Finally, the 
unique seating method used in the present design appears to be a useful 
experimental measure of personal space. From the experimenter's point 
of view, the seating method was useful because data analysis and re-
cording were quite easy. In contrast to the approach measure, the 
seating situation presented the subject with a forced choice. After 
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the subject entered the center of the seating circle to obtain the pen-
cil and questionnaires, he was free to choose any of the remaining 
seats. Since there were only two vacant chairs between each cohort, 
the subject was forced to sit next to one of the cohorts. This choice 
also meant that the subject was furthest from the.cohort seated on the 
opposite si·d~ of the circle, and the distance from the other cohort was. 
intennediate. Answers on the post-measure questionnaires, as well as 
many of the subjects' comments after debriefing, Stlggest one reason the 
seating method was sensitive was that its purpose was covert., 
If the present study were to be replicated, several modif~cations 
are suggested. A covert approach situation could involve the subject 
and each cohort in an activity that required them to be left alone in a 
room. to interact spontaneously for several minutes,, while personal space 
distances could be photographed by a hidden camera or observed through 
a one-way mirror. This would allow cohorts to assume a fixed position, 
while the subject approached to a natural, preferred distanc~. A 
longer list of motive and sociometric traits could help resolve the 
conflict between the present results and those of Wilson, Chun and 
Kayatani (1965) by providing greater potential variability in the 
ratings; It is also suggested that a modification of this design which 
would allow personal space measurelJ.lents to be taken while subjects were 
actually participating in the cooperative, competitive or neutral situ-
ations may provide more accurate measures of the treatment effects by 
avoiding any changes in feelings that may occur when trea~ment and 
measurement situations are separated by time. 
Extensions of the-pres~nt work could attempt to answer several 
questions that have resulted: (1) how stable are the present effects 
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over time; (2) what are the effects of more longlasting or intensive 
cooperative and competitive treatments; (3) can personal space differ-
ences be reversed by having cohorts switch cooperative or competitive 
roles; (4) what other types of feelings are.associated with these per-
sonal space differences; and (5) at what age do cooperation and compe-
tition begin to influence the personal space orientation of children or 
adolescents? Regarding this last question, the results of Fisher (1967) 
and Weinstine (1967) indicate that parental attitudes influence personal 
space at a relatively early age. If parents place high value on coop-
eration or competition, this emphasis may be reflected in the personal 
space orientations of the child. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to determine if cooperation and com-
petition are important variables influencing personal space. Personal 
space has· previously been. defined as a comp le~ of patte~ned spatial 
modes of relating to, and communicating with, others in the environment. 
Eighteen male college students were given cooperative, competitive and 
neutral game-playing experiences using the .Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
These game-playing expe;riences served as the experimental treatments. 
Three different types of personal space measures were taken,irnrnediately 
following the treatments. The three measures were approach, seating 
and questionnaire methods. It was predicted that the subjects would 
show a closer personal space orientation to the cooperative as opposed 
to the competitive cohort. The personal space orientation of the neu-
tral cohort was predicted to be intermediate. 
The seating measure showed a highly significant difference in the 
personal space orientation of the subject in the hypothesized order and 
direction. In addition to being analyzed as a whole, the questionnaire 
measure was also analyzed considering each of the four types of traits 
separately. The sociometric traits showed treatment effects that ap-
proached significance using the usual E test, but not the more conser-
vative Greenhouse-Geisser F test. This analysis also showed a treat-
ment by cohort group interaction that approached significance using 
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both the usual and conservative F tests. Analysis of the approach data 
produced no significant effects, All treatment means for all analyses 
were in the predicted o~der and direction. Overall the hypothesis of . 
this study, that personal space lessens as a function of cooperation, 
was seen as being supported. 
These results we.re found to be, in conflict with the work of Dosey . 
and Meisels (1969) who found an approach measure to be more sensitive 
than seating. Several methodological differences were offered as ex-
planations ,for this conflict.. The results generally agreed with a mun-
ber of studies which have found more.positive ingroup feelings are as~ 
sociated with cooperation, as opposed to competition. The present re~ 
sults were seen to support the theory.that cooperation and competitio~ 
are ,factors which contribute to the overall ·balance of cohesive and 
dispersive forces hypothesized to be present in personal space. In ad-
dition, some support was provided for those theories of behavior path-
ology th.at see disordered behavior as resulting from a change in a 
stable personality equilibrium. 
The major implications of the present results were seen to be: 
(1) personal space is a useful interactionai measure; (2) cooperation 
an~ competition appear to be factors ,that influence personal space; (3) 
deceptive approach measures may add extraneous variables to approach 
responses; and (4) the unique seating design used in the present study 
is an effective me~ure of personal· space. The seating measure was. 
seen as desirable because data analysis and recording were easy; its 
purpose seemed to be quite unapparent to the subjects, and it presented. 
the subjects with a forced choice. 
Several modifications and extensions.of the present work were 
suggested for further research. The questions raised by the present 
results were seen as bases for additional further research. 
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PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
There are two of you who are going to play a game in 
which you can either win money or lose money. The money is 
going to be in terms of pennies. I want you to feel that it 
really makes a difference to you whether you win a lot or a 
little .or whether you lose a lot or a little. 
Here is how the game is played. There are two of you, 
and how much you win or lose is determined not only by what 
you yourself do but also by what the other person does. On 
the paper which you have been handed there is a diagram which 
shows how the game is played. One of you is Person 1 (Person 
1 please raise your hand); the other is Person 2 (Person 2 
please raise your hand).· Person 1 has to choose between Row 
Ai and Row A2, while Person 2 has to choose between Column B1 
and Column B2. The amount of money that Person 1 can win or 
lose is indicated by the first numbers in the parentheses, 
the amount of money that Person 2 can win or lose is indi-
cated by the second numbers. 
How much money either of you wins or loses is determined 
by the choices which you each make. Let me illustrate by 
considering Person 1. Suppose he chooses Row Ai, whether he 
wins 9¢ or loses 10¢ will be determined by what Person 2 · 
does. If Person 1 chooses Row'A1 and Person 2 chooses Column 
B1, Person 1 will win 9¢. However, if Person l chooses Row 
Ai and Person 2 chooses Column B2, Person 1 will lose 10¢. 
Suppose Person 1 chooses Row A2, he will either win 10¢ or 
lose 9¢, depending upon whether Person .2 chooses Column B1 or 
Column B2. If you compare the choice between Rows Ai and A2 
for Person 1, you'll notice that, if he chooses A2 and Person 
2 chooses Column B1, Person 1 will win 10¢ rather than 9¢. 
If Person 1 chooses A2 and Person 2 chooses B2, he will lose 
only 9¢ rather than 10¢. 
Now let us consider Person 2, what he can win or lose is 
indicated by the second numbers in the parentheses. He has 
to choose between Column B1 and B2, how much he wins or loses 
is determined not only by his own choice but also by how Per-
son 1 chooses. Thus if Person 2 chooses Column B1 and Person 
1 chooses Row Ai, Person 2 will win 9¢. On the other hand, 
if Person 1 chooses A2 when Person 2 chooses B1, Person 2 
will lose 10¢. If Person 2 chooses B2 he can either win 10¢ 
or lose 9¢, depending upon what Person 1 does. If Person 1 
chooses Ai, Person 2 by choosing B2, will win 10¢ rather than 
9¢. If Person 1 chooses A2, Person 2, by choosing B2, will 
lose only 9¢ rather than 10¢. 
Let me point out an interesting thing. If Person 1 
chooses A2 and if Person 2 chooses B2, then both Person 1 and 
Person 2 will lose 9¢. On the other hand, if Person 1 
chooses Ai and Person 2 chooses B1, then both Person 1 and 2 
will win 9¢. However, if Person 1 knows or can be assured 
that Person 2 is going to choose B1, Person 1 can win more by 
choosing A2. Similarly, if Person 2 knows or can be assured 
that Person 1 is going to choose Ai, Person 2 can win more by 
choosing B2. If Person 1 chooses A2 when 2 chooses B1, 1 
will win 10¢ and 2 will lose 10¢. If Person 2 chooses B2 
when 1 chooses Ai, 2 will win 10¢ and 1 will lose 10¢. 
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Are there any questions about what happens wh.en Person 1 
chooses between Rows Ai and A2 and Person 2 chooses between 
Columns Bi and B2? (At this point they were asked some ques-
tions to ensure that there was complete cognitive clarity.) 
Okay, here's how you play the game. When I tell you to 
make your choice, you will make your choice in secret, not 
telling the other person of your choice. You will make your 
choice by simply selecting either a red or a blue poker chip 
from the stack in front of you. As you can see by the.dia-
gram, a blue poker chip means Row Ai if it is selected by 
Person 1, and it means Column B1 is the choice if it is se-
lected by Person 2. In a like manner, a red poker chip means 
Row A2 or Column B2 depending on whether Person 1 or Person 2 
is choosing. After yqu select a poker chip, keep it.con-
cealed in your hand behind the partitions until I tell you it 
is all right to display your choice. When I give you this 
signal, simply place the poker chip on this platform, keeping 
your own stack separate~ It will be. your job (indicating 
neutral cohort) to thus keep track of the money won or lost 
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Directions: Below is a list of pairs of adjectives which are op-
posite in meaning. Rate each of the other participants as accurately 
as possible by circling your response for each adjective pair. The 
following abbreviations are appropriate: E - extremely, M - moderately, 
S ~ slightly and N - neutral. 
Unkind E M s N s M E Kind 
Friendly E M s N s M E Unfriendly 
Intelligent E M s N s M E Unintelligent 
Cooperative E M s N s M E Uncooperative 
Mean E M s N s M E Nice 
Independent E M s N s M E Dependent 
Inefficient E M s N s M E Efficient 
Hostile E M s N s M E Cordial 
Anxious E M s N s M E Calrri 
Capable E M s N s M E Incapable 
Gullible E M s N s M E Knowledgeable 
Likable E M s N s M E Unlikable 
Unpleasant E M. s N s M E Pleasant 
Not competiti"l(e E M s N s M E Competitive 
Unselfish E M s N s M E Greedy 
Generous E M s N s M E Stingy 
Ugly E M s N s M E Attractive 
Desirabe as E M s N s M E Undesirable as 
a friend a friend 
Boring E M s N s M E Channing 
Messy E M s N s M E Orderly 
Ineffective E M s N s M E Effective 
Stubborn E M s N s M E Obliging 
Fair E M s N s M E Unfair 







1. What do you .. fe~l the purpose of th.is· experiment .was? 
2, How do you feel you contributed to this purpose? 
81 
(2) 
3. How "smooth" did the procedure of the experiment seem to go? 
4. What, if any, part of the experiment seemed "fake" or "unreal" to 
you? 
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